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5.2 The changing operational context of 
environmental organisations 
 
Studying WWF’s forestry models 
 
This sub-chapter looks more closely at how different economic contexts affect 
an environmental organisation, WWF, and its operations in Russia. WWF estab-
lished its first office in Moscow in 1994 and began bringing Western funding 
and expertise into the country in order to lighten the economic pressure on natu-
ral resources in Russia. The main focus of its efforts includes the preservation of 
old-growth forests and endangered species (see chapter 4.2). In 1997, WWF 
established an office in Vladivostok in the Russian Far East. The two offices, 
operating on opposite sides of Russia’s vast territory, have identical philoso-
phies and objectives for forest conservation. However, they work in very differ-
ent economic contexts. 
Our aim is to show how the spatial orientations of economic relations affect 
economic and institutional contexts in different parts of Russia (see chapter 
2.2.). The Russian forest sector is export-oriented both in Europe and Asia, but 
different consumer markets influence Russia’s supply chain in different ways. 
As we show in this sub-chapter, timber markets in Western Europe and North-
east Asia have differing levels of environmental sensitivity, and thus influence 
logging practices in Russia to different extents. WWF’s efforts in European 
Russia to green the logging industry find much support from the nearby envi-
ronmentally sensitive markets. On the contrary, the lack of environmental val-
ues in most Northeast Asian markets presents WWF with a more difficult situa-
tion. By analysing several WWF case studies from both sides of Russia, we 
show how the two different timber markets – that of Western Europe and that of 
Northeast Asia – influence the operations of WWF offices in the respective 
regions. We explore how the market context affects WWF’s operations and how 
successful they have been. 
When the borders of the former Soviet Union began opening in the early 
1990s, nearby foreign markets began to draw an increasing flow of Russia’s 
natural resources. The two regions of our analysis – Western Europe and North-
east Asia – represent two different ways in which this flow has been developing. 
In the West, in general, environmental consciousness is global in outlook, and 
the environmental movement of the West has begun to infiltrate Russia, greatly 
affecting its nature protection initiatives. China’s market economy is well de-
veloped, but environmental consciousness remains caged within the country. 
While European interests are pushing Russia towards environmental reform, 
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China and the Russian Far East have meshed to create a breeding ground for 
political corruption, a wild economy, illegal logging and unchecked environ-
mental degradation. China’s deforestation and flooding problems led in the late 
1990s to a government ban on logging throughout the country. Its domestic 
timber production fell nearly to zero and Russia quickly became a source of raw 
materials for China’s industry.  
We look at Russia’s borders not only as passive geographical entities but 
also as intermediaries that influence the country based on political, economic 
and social activities in its neighbouring states. These borders, which witness an 
outflow of timber from Russia, impact Russian forestry in different ways. The 
main impact comes from the type of market existing across these borders. As 
shown in the previous sub-chapter, while Russia acts as a timber supplier for 
both Western Europe and China, consumers with varying values influence this 
supply chain in different ways. The environmental sensitivity of the Western 
European markets influences Russian institutions to change forest management 
and forestry. On the contrary, Russia’s border with China has encouraged cor-
ruption, illegal logging and a wild market with no control over wood prices. 
Chinese NGOs do not go to Russia on greening missions, nor do the Chinese 
consumers make demands on timber production or forest conservation in Rus-
sia. This border influences the type of forestry we see in the Russian Far East. 
We analyse these processes and their effects on WWF’s regional specific opera-
tions. 
We also use the concept of non-state market driven governance (Cashore et 
al. 2004) to demonstrate how WWF tries to green the Russian supply side of the 
transnational wood flows to Europe and Asia. For our cases, the most important 
type of this governance is that under the Forest Stewardship Council. FSC out-
lines various criteria and standards of sustainable forestry that have gained le-
gitimacy nearly everywhere in the world. Companies that become FSC certified 
have an advantage in selling to sensitive markets that are willing to pay more for 
timber with the FSC stamp of sustainability. We study WWF’s efforts to import 
FSC to Russia, both in the European part and the Far East, as an example of 
non-state market driven governance. We analyse how FSC and sustainable for-
estry are gaining legitimacy with industry at unequal rates on different sides of 
Russia. By analysing a total of five initiatives to protect Russian forests by in-
fluencing its forestry sector, we illustrate WWF’s efforts in European Russia 
and the Far East. We have chosen WWF’s highest-profile efforts in both regions 
of the country and apply a qualitative case-study comparative approach (Yin 
1994).4 
                                               
4 The study is based on field work in which we visited each of the five localities and conducted a 
total of 85 in-depth interviews with representatives of NGOs, local and regional governments, 
industrial enterprises, research institutes and the public. 
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According to figures published by WWF, Russia contains nearly 21 percent 
of the world’s entire timber reserve, and nearly 25 percent of the remaining 
untouched, virgin forests on the planet (WWF 2000). WWF assigns a planetary 
value to these forests, and so they have expended great amounts of money and 
effort in their protection. In this process, they have come to play an important 
role in Russian forestry politics. WWF, together with the World Bank, has been 
aiming to bring the worldwide total of FSC-certified forests up to 200 million 
hectares by 2005. This includes the goal of 100 million hectares in the earth’s 
taiga forest zone, most of which lies in Russia (Tatarinov 2000). 
WWF’s primary strategy for achieving its goals is cooperation with and edu-
cation of major stakeholders in the Russian forestry sector. WWF aims to serve 
as an expert on sustainability for the Russian government, business, science and 
public, and claims that the FSC system of forestry would be beneficial for all 
these parties. Model forests are its most highly publicised ventures. For their 
establishment, WWF seeks out an interested stakeholder (such as a forestry 
corporation in the Pskov Oblast or the regional government in the Republic of 
Komi), partners with them, and attempts to create a local FSC model of sustain-
able forestry. The model forest projects import logging technology and selec-
tive-cutting techniques from Sweden. Ultimately, WWF hopes to spread the 
information and hands-on expertise gained from these projects to other parts of 
Russia. Thus, model forests serve as expensive and high-profile seeds of Scan-
dinavian forestry, which WWF wishes to plant in Russian soil. 
While there have been various attempts to establish such model forests in 
Russia (see e.g. Kolström & Leinonen 2000), two WWF model forest projects 
currently exist in the country. Both of them are located in European Russia. 
These are the Pskov Model Forest in the Pskov Oblast and the Priluz’e Model 
Forest in the Republic of Komi. We studied both of these projects. Located 
close to the Estonian border, forestry in the Pskov Oblast is export-oriented and 
also largely dependent on foreign buyers. Priluz’e is located west of the northern 
Ural Mountains, far from Russia’s borders, and, therefore, companies mainly 
provide wood for domestic timber markets. Nevertheless, WWF has been 
somewhat successful in legitimising FSC among forest stakeholders in the re-
gion. Western European governmental and non-governmental sources fund both 
of these projects. By analysing WWF’s partnerships with industry, government 
and the public in both localities, the influence of European expansion on north-
western Russia can be discerned. 
In the Far East, we focus on three of WWF’s demonstration projects in Pri-
morsk Krai. The first and most extensive effort has been the Dalnerechinsk 
leskhoz, where WWF has funded an inspection brigade called Kedr (Russian for 
“cedar”) to patrol the forests and roads in search of illegal logging operations. 
WWF has been trying to create a model territory where brigades could eliminate 
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criminal networks in forestry. This case demonstrates a very different approach 
by WWF in response to rampant illegal wood flows. WWF’s main partners in 
this project are state law enforcement agencies. The other two demonstration 
projects include one with the large Russian logging company Terney Les, and 
the other with the many smaller producers working in the Chuguevskii leskhoz. 
Terney Les is a unique company in the Far East, with advanced standards of 
technology and social benefits for its workers. Furthermore, it sells exclusively 
to the Sumetuma Corporation in Japan which, unlike China, currently represents 
a more environmentally conscious market. This case demonstrates the impor-
tance of markets in influencing timber producers in Russia. In the Chuguevskii 
leskhoz, WWF has joined logging companies, non-timber forest resource com-
panies and hunting groups into an association that will attempt to receive a joint 
FSC certificate. Both of these model projects include a concerted effort by 
WWF to find consumers in Northeast Asian countries that are interested in certi-
fied sustainable products. The work of WWF’s Vladivostok office illustrates the 
current barriers in building sustainable Asian trade. 
 
 
Bringing FSC to European Russia 
 
As shown in previous chapters, the environmental movement of the West ex-
panded into Russia alongside business interests after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. Of the NGOs, WWF has become an especially important conduit for 
bringing Western environmentalism to Russia. Model forests represent WWF’s 
most significant attempts to influence forestry and Russian forest producers. 
WWF’s two presently active model forests, Pskov and Priluz’e, are both very 
lucid examples of WWF bringing the culture of Western environmentalism to 
the regions of Russia close to the European Union. They both highlight FSC as a 
sustainability tool that allows forest production to be readily influenced by for-
est consumers, specifically those of Western Europe. They also show how 
WWF’s achievements in European Russia directly stem from the proximity of 
an environmentally sensitive market in Western Europe. 
The first model we investigate, the Pskov Model Forest, features a close 
partnership between WWF-Russia and a subsidiary of the multinational logging 
firm Stora Enso. This company was formed as a fusion of the Swedish Stora and 
Finnish Enso Group in 1998 (see www.storaenso.com). This company has 
logged in Russia for many years and took a hit from a conflict with the envi-
ronmental movement in the mid-1990s (Tysiachniouk and Reisman 2003; Vo-
robiov 1999). Greenpeace vilified the company in the media for logging Rus-
sia’s old-growth forests. With its environmental image tarnished, Enso’s Rus-
sian subsidiaries were forced to halt logging of old-growth forests (see chapter 
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5.1). In response, a new export-oriented logging subsidiary STF-Strugy was 
established in the settlement of Strugy-Krasnie in the Pskov Oblast in an attempt 
to meet FSC standards of sustainability and recapture the international timber 
markets. In this way, it tried to transplant Western standards of sustainable for-
estry into Russia. 
While STF-Strugy received an FSC certificate in April 2003, at first these 
standards and techniques frequently conflicted with the Russian forest code and 
accepted industry norms. The company was repeatedly fined by the leskhoz for 
violations. Not being the PR powerhouse that WWF is, STF-Strugy failed to 
resolve these conflicts. In 2000, WWF came to the region and partnered with the 
company. In essence, two global actors, WWF and Stora Enso, descended on a 
small, ordinary Russian locality and modified the region’s commercial envi-
ronment to comfortably suit European businessmen. WWF created an action 
plan based on scientific research for the company, and coordinates each move 
with government officials, while STF-Strugy carries out the logging as the ac-
tion plan specifies. 
WWF launched a campaign to network with all the stakeholders and educate 
them in sustainable forestry, the ultimate goal being to convince them that STF-
Strugy must be allowed to log according to FSC. For the government, WWF 
held seminars and workshops, sent written information about FSC and organised 
a few trips to Sweden so that government officials could study logging sites 
similar to those that WWF and STF-Strugy wished to establish. Pskov Model 
Forest’s demonstration plots became a key instrument with which to educate 
forest stakeholders. By logging different forest plots with different technologies 
and techniques, the model forest showed different volumes of wood production 
with different repercussions for the secondary forest. Furthermore, WWF estab-
lished a small grant programme that would pay for any research or creative 
project that pertained to the Pskov Model Forest. This strategy is very effective 
in the Russian context, because while forestry research is actually very ad-
vanced, there is often little funding directed toward implementation. Thus, 
WWF’s small grant programme became a unique opportunity for government 
officials in the Ministry for Natural Resources, several of whom carried out 
forestry research funded by WWF. 
Before WWF, STF-Strugy had also conflicted with the local public. 
Throughout the country, Russian citizens are directly dependent on forests, 
including the wild mushrooms and berries found therein. For this reason, a gen-
eral public mistrust of forestry exists. According to a social expert hired by 
WWF, the sight of a truck carrying logs meant that “things are going badly in 
the forests” (Interview 33). In addition, community members were especially 
suspicious of a foreign company which they felt was sending their forests 
abroad. In working with the community, it became WWF’s job to soothe public 
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opposition to forestry as such by illustrating the difference between conven-
tional Russian forestry and FSC sustainable forestry. In effect, through an exten-
sive PR campaign, WWF argued that by switching to the new FSC way of doing 
things, the Russian economy, environment and society would benefit. In the 
rhetoric, WWF tied these opportunities to lucrative and environmentally sensi-
tive Western timber markets. WWF used television programmes and newspaper 
publications, and organised seminars and workshops. 
In all projects that require the involvement of the Russian public, WWF uses 
the local intelligentsia (the educated class) as a tool for linking with the rest of 
the population. Pskov Model Forest’s small grant programme focused on scien-
tists, teachers, educators, a museum curator, and librarians. These people are 
often community leaders and help shape the rest of the community. For this 
reason, a social expert working with WWF called such citizens a “golden fund” 
which will “help to form public opinion” (Interview 33). Teachers and educators 
help to spread knowledge and ideas, and shape the mindset of the succeeding 
generations. WWF brought its model forest, its money and its panda symbol 
into the classroom by funding teachers’ environmental education initiatives 
through the project’s small grant programme. This includes such programmes as 
recycling, nature calendars, computer education and a Children’s Club of 
Friends of WWF. With the benefits of FSC forestry and Western logging tech-
nology in school curricula, they seek to become part of the local culture. This is 
WWF’s ultimate goal throughout Russia: to establish Nordic-style sustainable 
forestry as a permanent feature of Russian environmental culture. 
One of WWF’s main strategies with the small grant programme was to take 
activities that already exist and enhance their quality while steering them toward 
environmental awareness and support for the Pskov Model Forest. Grants 
funded ecological summer camps and environmental clubs, and even turned a 
traditional community festival that involved a tradition of saying good-bye to 
winter into one with an environmental slant. One interesting advertising strategy 
saw WWF sponsor a local school’s soccer team. The team was called Panda, 
and the uniforms contained the WWF panda logo as well as the emblem of the 
Pskov Model Forest. Each game they play promotes nature and everywhere the 
team goes they bring information about the Model Forest. WWF further im-
pressed the local population by bringing the famous football team Zenit from St. 
Petersburg to play with the Panda team. Many people expressed excitement 
about this game, which also had a theme and a symbol for nature. In short, 
WWF used the project’s extensive funds to establish the Panda logo as a lasting 
visual fixture and the phrase “sustainable forestry” as a lasting linguistic fixture 
in the Strugy-Krasnie community. The model forest, and its demonstration plots, 
became a renowned and one-of-a-kind tool for environmental education. 
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FSC criteria demand that the local community should have a voice in for-
estry decisions. Raising public interest in the model forest, which WWF accom-
plished, laid the groundwork for official public participation. The model forest 
created a local forest club that theoretically brings all forest stakeholders to-
gether into a productive dialogue. The forest club meets once every three 
months, and attendees include representatives of STF-Strugy, leskhoz workers, 
administration, forest scientists, WWF staff and all interested local citizens. 
WWF publicises the forest club as a model of democracy and citizen involve-
ment in forestry as it ideally, although not practically, happens in the Western 
Europe and North America. 
WWF brought an invaluable capacity to its partnership with STF-Strugy. By 
acquiring partners and support for the Pskov Model Forest, WWF laid the foun-
dation for popular acceptance of STF-Strugy’s foreign logging practices and the 
introduction of FSC in general. Many logging companies, both Russian and 
foreign, that work in northwestern Russia primarily export to Western European 
markets. Thus, the commercial stage for FSC legitimacy already existed in the 
region. WWF simply had to find a willing commercial partner and spread in-
formation to all stakeholders. In the Pskov Oblast, the leskhoz, the public and 
Russian scientists quickly accepted FSC forestry as sustainable and economi-
cally beneficial. Pskov governmental structures also support the project, but not 
to the extent shown in our next case study. Priluz’e Model Forest demonstrates 
different levels of support for FSC among different stakeholders. However, it 
most importantly confirms that the influence of European commercial opportu-
nities, and the accompanying environmentalism, can penetrate far into Russia’s 
interior. 
Since 1997, WWF had planned to create the Priluz’e Model Forest in a re-
gion of Russia less suited to westward exports than the Pskov Oblast. While 
Pskov gives timber producers the advantage of proximity to foreign markets and 
the infrastructure to export, the Komi Republic lies just west of the northern 
Ural Mountains and represents a far more common situation in forestry in Rus-
sia’s vast interior. Nevertheless, the Priluz’e Model Forest, situated in the 
Priluz’e leskhoz, received an FSC certificate of sustainability in 2003. While the 
model forest separated from WWF in 2002 and renamed as Silver Taiga, the 
story presented here concerns the period of WWF’s efforts. 
WWF’s main partner in the Priluz’e Model Forest was the Priluz’e leskhoz, 
which is a governmental structure. The aim of this project was not to certify the 
leased land of one company, as the Pskov Model Forest is trying with to do 
STF-Strugy, but rather to certify the forest management of the entire leskhoz. In 
a sense, the leskhoz acts as a local representative of the forest landowner – the 
federal government. Although the Priluz’e leskhoz has received an FSC certifi-
cate, wood produced by leasing companies in the leskhoz will not bear the FSC 
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mark. For this to happen, individual companies must certify the entire chain-of-
custody. The certification already obtained gives these companies a head start 
and may promote their interest. In this way, the Priluz’e Model Forest has been 
somewhat successful in bringing international standards to Russian forestry. 
There is some criticism of the project’s on-the-ground forestry improvements, 
many coming from the director of the Priluz’e leskhoz. However, the achieve-
ment of FSC certification is an important benchmark in the incorporation of 
Russian logging into European timber flows. 
With the government, FSC has gained a great deal of legitimacy from this 
project. WWF’s Priluz’e Model Forest has received extensive support from the 
local, regional and national levels of government. In our interviews, government 
officials showed themselves to be quite passionate about the model forest and its 
potential for bettering the region’s economy. The head of the Priluz’e’s admini-
stration said, “We really need the model forest to get the certificate” (Interview 
34). Furthermore, Komi’s government shows a sense of personal ownership 
over this forest. The head of administration in the Priluz’e region said, “we look 
at the project like our own child” (Interview 34), while officials at the republic 
level claim that the model forest is a government initiative. Another official 
said, “In this project, everything started with the power structure, with the gov-
ernment” (Interview 35). WWF cooperates with many departments of the repub-
lic’s government, including the economic, judicial, forest and transport authori-
ties. Several of these authorities have representatives working closely with 
model forest employees to develop FSC certification standards for Komi. Our 
respondent felt that these government officials are dedicated to the project. Be-
sides the small grant recipients, government officials receive no pay for this 
work. Government officials in Komi have shown much more excitement about 
the project than those in Pskov, as the following interviewee shows: 
 
I sometimes wonder what their interest is, besides scientific interest. 
There cannot be much material interest. We usually meet in the work-
ing group for 2-6 hours, sometimes the whole day. Everybody is listen-
ing, adding, suggesting, and arguing. Sometimes fights occur. (Inter-
view 36) 
 
As in Pskov, WWF’s small grant programme helped build government support. 
Several government officials at the republic level received grants for forestry 
research and expressed a deep satisfaction for this opportunity provided by 
WWF. The model forest also took some government officials to Sweden in 
order to show them FSC-certified operations. Such efforts quickly brought gov-
ernment support to the project in the form of scientific knowledge, leniency with 
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forestry norms and participation in the model forest’s strategy development and 
planning group. 
There are, however, certain ways in which the Priluz’e leskhoz cannot com-
pare with STF-Strugy as a model forest partner. For the past ten years, federal 
budgets have notoriously underfunded leskhozes. Forest management such as 
revitalisation, fighting forest fires and controlling illegal logging, for which 
leskhoz workers are responsible, remains very weak due to extremely low sala-
ries. Leskhoz workers are also responsible for thinning forests in order to pro-
duce higher yields. These hardships reflect on the performance of the model 
forest. In January 2002, a restructuring of the forest sector further hurt forest 
workers, and the head of the Priluz’e leskhoz then considered certification 
unlikely. While the leskhoz did in fact receive certification the following year, 
this respondent worried about its permanence: 
 
Maybe we will get the certificate now but … next year we will have 
real difficulties. They can take it from us and it will be much harder to 
get it back the second time (Interview 37). 
 
The leskhoz is an unstable and unreliable partner for WWF’s work, as the Rus-
sian government has been destabilising the administrative structures. STF-
Strugy, however, as a subsidiary of a large multinational corporation, has al-
lowed the Pskov Model Forest to run more smoothly than Priluz’e. Neverthe-
less, both projects received FSC certification and show the transformation of the 
Russian forest sector in two disparate parts of European Russia. 
For the social aspects of FSC certification, WWF acted much as it did in 
Pskov. At first, this project encountered similar barriers from the public, includ-
ing widespread suspicion of forestry in general. The head of the Priluz’e Model 
Forest’s public outreach explained that people assume all logs carried by trucks 
come from the same plot, leaving nothing (Interview 39). WWF overcame this 
perception by preaching the Western gospel of sustainable forestry, especially 
its social facet, which would benefit the public. The information was circulated 
through libraries and schools, discussion clubs were created and the media was 
used to create television shows, newspaper articles and art shows dedicated to 
preserving nature. Through the small grant programme WWF funded Ph.D. 
research into forest economics for local students and helped revitalise old Soviet 
structures for producing non-timber forest resources. Community relations rep-
resented an extensive aspect of the Priluz’e Model Forest. 
In order to involve the public in forestry, WWF created a club similar to 
Pskov’s forest club. It is called Shuvge Parma (“the sound of wind through the 
taiga forest”). The meetings of this club include various members of the local 
public, leskhoz workers, scientists and power structures. One difference between 
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this and Pskov’s forest club is the size of the Priluz’e leskhoz and the fact that it 
contains dispersed villages, all of which are involved in Shuvge Parma. Shuvge 
Parma is, therefore, mobile and travels to different villages throughout the re-
gion, holding meetings and promoting public participation. A successful exam-
ple of public participation started by this club is the case of virgin forests in the 
territory of the model forest. Here, WWF was able to mobilise members of the 
population to protect a virgin area that had already been leased by the large 
company Luza Les. WWF first had to explain the concept of old-growth forest, 
but it was easily accepted by much of Komi’s rural population, which is gener-
ally against industrial harvesting of any kind. Luza Les had already begun build-
ing an access road to log this plot of old-growth forest, but WWF successfully 
educated and linked with influential members of the local population (i.e. intel-
ligentsia) to oppose the company. In the end, Luza Les gave up most of the plot, 
while a compromise allowed them to log four small sections. 
One aspect of how WWF tried to align the Priluz’e leskhoz with FSC’s so-
cial standards demonstrates the constraints of working with a leskhoz as the 
main partner. WWF held public meetings in which citizens could highlight areas 
where they gather berries and mushrooms, and the model forest created a map 
of important gathering spots. In theory, this map would be used by companies 
when choosing their logging plots. On a lesser note, the map has become only a 
tool of the leskhoz for advising companies about those plots where they may 
encounter resistance from the local population. In this way, certification of a 
leskhoz does not directly transfer to logging operations. 
The model forest has had an effect on the environmental thinking of leskhoz 
workers and implementation of educational and demonstration programmes has 
begun. Yet, while WWF’s relationship with the government is close and very 
effective, the leskhoz is not the main entity cutting the trees. Therefore, it has 
been a real challenge to promote changes in companies oriented toward domes-
tic Russian consumers. 
 
 
WWF in Asian Russia 
 
WWF’s role in the Russian Far East has primarily been determined by the re-
gion’s lawlessness. For this reason, WWF-Vladivostok has partnered with state 
law enforcement agencies, where the main objective is to create a stronger sys-
tem of control. We see a marked difference from WWF’s work in European 
Russia, where WWF’s goal is to include Russia in the markets of Western 
Europe, while in the Far East, in WWF’s view, the criminal networks and wild 
wood flows must be tamed before anything resembling a steady timber industry 
can result. WWF-Vladivostok also concentrates heavily on market creation 
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strategies. WWF seeks out buyers in Northeast Asia that are interested in FSC 
products and links them to interested exporters within Russia. This effort in-
volves expert economists, various publications, and cooperation with WWF 
programme offices in China, Japan and Hong Kong. 
WWF’s work in the Far East began in the mid-1990s with the goal of pre-
serving the dwindling tiger population in eastern Primorsk Krai. In conjunction 
with other foundations, it created a state inspection team called “Tiger”, which 
would seek to prevent poaching and confiscate tiger skins and other body parts. 
This new structure operated under the Federal Ministry for Natural Resources, 
and represented WWF’s initiation into the law enforcement sector of the Far 
East. WWF soon found, however, that the destruction of forests through ram-
pant illegal logging posed a much greater threat to the tiger, as well as to the 
region’s environmental and economic sustainability. The main focus of WWF’s 
Vladivostok office is not only to preserve the tiger but also to disrupt criminal 
networks and break the mafia’s control of the region’s forest sector. 
WWF says that it faces a complicated and powerful illegal logging industry 
in the Far East, which often includes government, leskhozes and big business as 
well as impoverished peasants selling illegal logs for survival. The then-
governor of the Primorsk Krai was cashing in on the region’s illegal wood har-
vest. He established a municipal enterprise, Stelz (a corruption of the English 
word “Stealth”), responsible for selling wood confiscated from illegal logging 
operations. An accompanying administrative order stated that all such confis-
cated wood could only be sold through Stelz, and no other company. According 
to the Russian forest code, all confiscated wood belongs to the leskhoz, thus this 
order contradicted Russian law. However, there was no protest from leskhozes, 
who were often in cahoots. Several thousand cubic metres of undocumented 
wood have since been found in Stelz’s wood storages, and several invoices held 
by the enterprise were shown to be counterfeit. Needless to say, Kedr received 
little support from the government at this time. 
Nearly all wood harvested in the Primorsk and Khabarovsk Krais, both le-
gally and illegally, goes through one of two main storage and transportation 
hubs – Dalnerechinsk and Lesozavodsk. These two settlements see corruption 
and crime linked with illegal logging and export of logs to China. The transac-
tions that bring Russian timber through their storages concern large volumes, 
low prices and quick cash. Local government structures are said by the WWF 
respondents to be fully aware of these illegal transfers yet they fail to inspect or 
enforce. Virtually all of our respondents, including environmental activists and 
independent journalists, claim that the head of Dalnerechinsk’s administration 
has connections to the region’s organised criminal structures. 
This insufferable economic and environmental situation stems directly from 
China’s willingness to accept logs without histories. China itself banned logging 
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in 18 of its provinces, simultaneously with the vast volumes of illegal timber 
coming from Russia. China’s civil society remains undeveloped, with opposi-
tion to the government confined to sporadic and small-scale activities (Ho 
2001). Yet, proximity to China not only allows this form of wild economy but 
encourages it. In the Far East regions of Russia farther from China, timber har-
vests are remarkably lower due to more difficult transportation. The Primorsk 
and Khabarovsk Krais offer huge forests of valuable wood with unfettered ex-
port opportunities, given China’s proximity and demands. Environmentalists 
admit that the social and economic consequences of this economy outweigh 
environmental damage in gravity. 
 
WWF-Vladivostok’s main effort to disrupt this timber flow has con-
sisted of the Model Forest Inspection Brigade called Kedr in Primorsk 
Krai. Before its dispersal in 2002 due to legislation change and turning 
into a private security company, Kedr was a group of four men in a 
jeep, equipped with communication technology, computer databases 
and guns, who checked logging trucks for the wood’s legal documenta-
tion. Kedr existed as an individual brigade within Tiger, but dealt spe-
cifically with illegal logging. Initially, Tiger brigades, including Kedr, 
were affiliated with and supervised by government structures, but all 
funds, equipment, training, legal counselling and salaries came from 
WWF-Vladivostok. WWF created Kedr as a model that enforcement 
agencies could, in theory, reproduce. The effort began region-wide in 
Primorsk Krai, but WWF has since seated the brigade in one locality, 
Dalnerechinsk, in order to create a more effective, focused model. As 
mentioned before, Dalnerechinsk wood storages are hotbeds of crime, 
with 80 percent of the wood handled there claimed to come from illegal 
harvests (WWF 2000). The Dalnerechinsk leskhoz has become some-
thing of a WWF model forest in the Far East. 
 
In day-to-day operations, Kedr’s main partners were the law enforcement 
agencies of Primorsk’s regional government. Kedr existed as one brigade within 
Tiger, which in turn existed under the Federal Ministry for Natural Resources. 
Kedr was a new type of structure for the Russian government. WWF attempted 
to create a state entity suited to the Far East situation, one that would have com-
bined eclectic responsibilities from different law enforcement and judicial agen-
cies scattered throughout the regional and Federal levels of government. The 
structure of Russia’s regional government and its legislation did not provide a 
comfortable environment for Kedr, and therefore it had to work with an array of 
other agencies in order to do its job. 
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For instance, when Kedr went on raids, it brought officials from the local 
militia. The two agencies worked together, with the police using their authority 
to stop logging trucks, and Kedr used its legal training to identify violations in 
the truck’s documents or wood. Kedr advised the militia officers to take appro-
priate actions according to the specific violations of the forest code, which 
WWF’s hired lawyer explained to them. Logging trucks, legally, needed not to 
stop and undergo inspection under Kedr’s orders. Militia, on the other hand, had 
this right, but with legislation so incredibly confusing and constantly rewritten, 
they did not know the nuances of the forest code. Kedr also could not write 
protocols itself. Other departments of the police force, including the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs (MVD), Regional Management of Internal Affairs (RUVD), 
State Inspection of Transportation Safety (GIBDD) and the Highway Police 
(GUYEE), joined Kedr on its raids. Kedr partnered with all of these agencies, 
and tried to improve their qualifications in law enforcement. Kabanetz, both a 
former state and private forest worker and current leader of Kedr, said, “Our 
dream is to make those agencies which have to work, actually work” (Interview 
39). Kedr had less intimate relationships with other state agencies, including the 
Department for Investigating Organised Crime (UBOP). Kedr gave information 
and statistics to this department, which then used it for analysing criminal net-
works. 
In addition to corrupt power structures, Kedr’s operations on the logging 
roads were fraught with hindrances and complications. Documents and forest 
tickets were photocopied, incorrectly filled out, or filled out with erasable ink 
and reused. Enterprises logged more than allowed, logged beyond prearranged 
borders, or logged prohibited species such as cedar. Organised crime networks 
engaged in blackmail and threats to acquire felling tickets or even logs already 
in transport. In 2001 when the administration of Primorsk Krai required a new 
transportation certificate to accompany all timber shipments, the certificates 
quickly became a new currency on the black market. One fresh certificate sold 
for US$300 and they soon became useless as tools of enforcement. In the sum-
mer of 2001 their use was discontinued. Nevertheless, companies without 
documents often bribed checkpoint employees or used scare tactics. Logging 
trucks were accompanied by cars with armed individuals who negotiated with 
transport militia. Other tricks to avoid fines and regulations included borrowing 
logging trucks from other regions, hiring drivers who were not involved in the 
logging company, and shaving one strip off logs so that they became “proc-
essed” wood and were no longer liable to the controls of transporting unproc-
essed logs. 
Despite the difficulties, Kedr achieved many things. The storages of Dalni-
rechinsk were more than halved and the timber flow to China decreased. The 
radical environmental group BROK discounted the role of Kedr in these positive 
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statistics, but rather saw a rapid degeneration of the region’s forests as the cause 
(Interview 40). BROK’s leader claimed that as roadside forests disappear, com-
panies must push their operations farther into the forest and compete for the 
dwindling worthwhile timber. This, according to BROK, was the reason for the 
decreased flow of illegal timber, and not the watchdog activities of Kedr. Yet, 
despite BROK’s publications, the public of Primorsk Krai turned Kabenetz, 
Kedr’s leader, into something of a star. One respondent said that Kabanetz was 
called a “TV star” because he was so well known by the public (Interview 41). 
Kedr also gained a reputation of total honesty and incorruptibility. With bribes 
circulating en masse through first and second sectors of the Far East, Kabanetz 
in particular became known as a very dedicated and reliable worker for justice 
(Interview 42). 
Nevertheless, the governments of the Far East came to support Kedr’s efforts 
and were reproducing the brigade. In December 2000, the government of Pri-
morsk adopted Kedr’s model and created 14 new brigades, each based within a 
leskhoz. Another brigade called Sobol (Russian for “sable”), was created in the 
nearby Jewish Autonomous Region. WWF published a handbook for the inspec-
tors. The book outlines the proper procedures as well as the rights of enforce-
ment officials to prosecute forest violations. WWF is helping these brigades, as 
newly formed state structures, to “catch up with new laws and regulations and 
be confident to do the right things when dealing with violators” (Interview 43). 
These brigades will operate mainly on roads, as Kedr did, and with similar mo-
bility, communications technology and authority as part of the forest enforce-
ment forces of the state. 
Two model projects in Primorsk Krai, Terney Les and Chuguevka, are 
WWF’s attempts to introduce FSC certification into the timber markets of the 
region. One is in conjunction with the company Terney Les, a gigantic Russian 
logging company operating in Primorsk Krai. WWF is helping this company to 
write environmental policies for production and update its practices in order to 
FSC certify the timber that it produces. With Chuguevka, WWF has the same 
goal of FSC certification, but the situation is much different. Chuguevka is a 
large territory in the Sikhote-Alin ridge of Primorsk Krai and hosts a wide vari-
ety of natural resource production. This includes timber, non-wood forest re-
sources and hunting. WWF’s goal with this model project is to designate the 
national park “Call of the Tiger” as the centrepiece of the territory, with sur-
rounding sustainable production under one joint FSC certificate. 
Although this closely resembles their model forests in European Russia, 
WWF is hesitant to call their work in the Far East a “model forest”. The reasons 
for this hesitation lie within the wild economic situation there. WWF is less 
willing to invest large sums of money in the region, given the uncertain possi-
bilities of achievement, and thus feels that the label model forest would be “too 
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loud” (Interview 44). WWF is extremely concerned with its image and focuses 
funds on probable successes. It is using the experience from its model forests in 
Terney Les and Chuguevka, but as they say: “We want to achieve our goal here 
with less blood” (Interview 44). 
These projects are in their initial stages, but they have seen forward move-
ment. This is especially true of Terney Les, which had largely modernised its 
operations before partnering with WWF. On a joint expedition both Greenpeace 
and WWF activists were surprised at the environmental soundness and quality 
of the logging operations of there (Interview 45). This company, which our 
respondents compared with some of the more advanced logging enterprises in 
the West, exports timber exclusively to the Japanese company Sumetuma. 
Terney Les processes some of its timber, even commercially “worthless” tree 
species such as aspen and birch. Leftovers are consumed in the settlement of 
Plastun for heating. All the employees of Terney Les live in this settlement and, 
according to a member of WWF, salaries are decent and people like their jobs 
(Interview 42). A company with this record, when compared with the more 
prevalent criminal standard of forest production in the region, is suitable for a 
WWF model project. Terney Les even has a plot of valuable virgin forest cur-
rently under lease, which will, if protected by WWF, only add to the flavour of 
their nature-protection triumph. Since this virgin plot is used by an indigenous 
Udege community living nearby, WWF sees a special value in resolving this 
conflictive situation. Working with Terney Les will give WWF a better chance 
of securing FSC’s foothold in the region’s timber industry. 
WWF’s partner in business in Chuguevka differs considerably from Terney 
Les. Chuguevka has no gigantic company to link with and no virgin forests to 
save from the saw. WWF, however, sees many advantages to working with all 
producers in this territory. Roads and fire-fighting infrastructure, which WWF 
itself has funded in the past, will allow for more efficient forestry, since Chu-
guevka landscapes are very resilient and grow back quickly after logging. 
Moreover, while many involved in the logging issues of the Far East see larger 
companies as harbingers of a stable, normal timber industry, others see small 
companies as inherently more green because of their local orientation: 
 
I think these small companies are more sustainable and more oriented 
toward the local well-being. Local people chair the companies and live 
in the community. They are not planning to cut and leave. Their moti-
vation is actually partly ecological because they are local people and 
live in this forest (Interview 33). 
 
Overall, in Chuguevka, WWF has united various producers into an Ecological 
Association of Nature Users in order to unite and organise the FSC effort. 
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WWF’s partnership with this association involves advising companies on sus-
tainable harvesting techniques. WWF helps introduce ecological principles into 
production, has donated a computer to the club, and continues to advise and 
organise meetings.  
WWF mainly helps the association through work taking place outside of 
Russia. In cooperation with WWF branches in Japan, China, South Korea and 
other environmental NGOs of East Asia, WWF-Vladivostok has embarked on a 
market campaign to locate all Northeast Asian buyers interested in environmen-
tally friendly products. This involves working with the Internet, writing letters 
and, put simply, amassing a network of green consumers with which the pro-
ducers of Chuguevka can be linked. WWF disseminates this information to 
Chuguevka’s producers at the meetings of the association, and through publica-
tions such as one pamphlet, in Russian and English, entitled “Market Opportuni-
ties for Certified Forest Products in North-East Asia”. 
With WWF in Russia, this method of greening the market is unique to 
WWF’s Vladivostok office. The need for this activity clearly comes from the 
necessity of taming the wild wood flows. Such a concerted effort would not be 
necessary in European Russia, where international European NGOs have al-
ready created a demand for certified Russian timber. Introducing FSC, as WWF 
does throughout European Russia, is in itself a form of market manipulation in 
that WWF is helping companies in Russia to meet Western European market 
demands. In the Russian Far East, this type of environmental market remains 
hindered, ultimately, by the chaos left in the wake of the Soviet Union’s col-
lapse. 
 
 
Market-driven governance as a strategy in the WWF 
efforts 
 
Globalisation has changed the spatial position of the Russian forests and, simul-
taneously, introduced both intensified utilisation and a measure of protection 
(cf. chapter 2.2). Since the opening of the border, companies both inside and 
outside Russia have tried to cash in on the country’s vast forest resources. Si-
multaneously, the opening of the border has allowed transnational environ-
mental organisations to enter the country’s industrial and political arenas in 
order to protect those resources. Without the international intervention and the 
networks created by organisations such as WWF, Russia could easily become a 
worldwide exporter of raw materials and roundwood. Without the enormous 
funds pouring into Russia from abroad, transnational wood flows would be 
wilder and more devastating for the Russian environment. We have seen such 
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negative tendencies in trade subside to some extent in European Russia, and at 
least show some promising signs in the Far East.  
Our case studies demonstrated the effectiveness of WWF’s influence on ex-
port markets in Russia, and how this influence varies within different regional 
market contexts in these two areas. The Pskov and Priluz’e Model Forests have 
been successful due to the forest sector’s desire to sell to sensitive Western 
European markets. With corporate and NGO networks extending across the 
border, decisions made by environmentally conscious European consumers 
penetrate and influence Russia. 
Our cases in the Far East show an economic situation where illegal opera-
tions have gained momentum over the preceding decade, and have been taken 
over by organised criminal networks. Illegal logging remains profitable for them 
and in demand in the neighbouring countries, especially among consumers 
across Russia’s border with China. We did, however, see some signs of change 
in the values of Far Eastern forestry. WWF has effectively partnered with le-
gitimate companies and begun creating model areas. Unlike in Europe, the in-
credible scope of illegal logging has created a business environment where rela-
tive sustainability may still be unsustainable. Yet, at the same time, companies 
interested in greening their production through FSC certification are much more 
praiseworthy given the pervasiveness of crime. FSC’s value in Europe is wide-
spread, but in the east WWF must engage in extensive market research to find 
green buyers. The two regions present WWF with two different nature protec-
tion situations and WWF employs strategies and acts accordingly. 
The concept “non-state market driven governance” by Cashore et al. (2004) 
is of interest for analysing the in-depth look at FSC’s legitimacy in Western 
timber flows. Cashore showed various ways in which NGOs legitimise FSC in 
North America and Western Europe and promote an interest in certification. His 
three strategies of legitimising FSC include “converting” – an active process 
whereby NGOs convince stakeholders of FSC legitimacy; “conforming” – 
changing FSC principles to better fit producer interests; and “informing” – 
spreading information to candidates likely to prefer FSC certification (Cashore 
et al. 2004). The promotion of FSC certification in European Russia consists 
mainly of “converting”. Here, FSC’s value stands on a foundation built by vari-
ous transboundary NGOs over the last 30 years. Greenpeace and WWF, the 
leaders of the West’s environmental pack, have tag-teamed the ideologies and 
methods of wood production in the West, with a differing radical and a more 
centrist approach, respectively. WWF’s vast networks and information cam-
paigns tend more toward Cashore’s definition of “informing”. Greenpeace’s 
protests and market campaigns of the 1990s have already done much of the 
“converting”. Nonetheless, WWF’s model forests do demonstrate a good deal of 
convincing work. The demand for sustainable wood in Europe and the associ-
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ated desire of European companies to import FSC to Russia create an immedi-
ately apparent legitimacy. Greenpeace and WWF “converted” Russian stake-
holders by simply highlighting this reality. 
In the Far East, a “conversion” strategy would be less effective due to the 
prevalence of markets lacking values of sustainability. This continues despite 
non-state market pressure from WWF and other NGOs. While various boycotts 
in Europe created an interest in FSC, the few companies working with WWF in 
the Far East have agreed to seek certification without excessive Greenpeace-
type protests. Cashore sees the boycott as one of the most effective methods of 
conversion. But we mainly saw “informing” in WWF’s Far East promotion of 
FSC certification. Thus, Cashore’s assumptions would lead us to predict other-
wise – that WWF’s work in Asia would be joined by a loud and radical element 
of environmental activism to forcefully change the unsustainable tendencies of 
the region’s markets. The fact that WWF informs rather than converts in Rus-
sia’s wilder markets seems counterintuitive. As we saw, WWF’s market re-
search consists of finding companies interested in environmentally sustainable 
trade and linking them together. It is the difficulty of the Far Eastern market-
place that parties interested in sustainable trade are fewer and farther between 
than in the Western Europe. However, they exist, and WWF is creating net-
works among them. 
We find many other ways in which Cashore’s findings do not transfer 
smoothly to the Far East context. We see this in the description of Cashore et al. 
(2004) of certain characteristic forestry situations that would increase or de-
crease the ease of promoting FSC legitimacy. For instance, Cashore states that 
FSC will more easily take hold in export-oriented regions than in those focusing 
on a domestic timber market. Concerning westward wood flows from Russia, 
the Pskov and Priluz’e Model Forests uphold this hypothesis. Companies work-
ing in the Priluz’e leskhoz, most of which do not export to Europe, have been 
slow to support WWF’s project. Pskov, on the other hand, hosts a subsidiary of 
a multinational timber corporation which expressed an interest in FSC before 
partnering with WWF. Cashore’s assumption does not hold when applied to the 
Far East, where export does not automatically entail sales to greener markets. 
The timber industry’s dependence on China actually hinders the legitimacy of 
FSC in that region of Russia. His theory is not applicable to this region of FSC 
germination. 
In another hypothesis, Cashore predicts that FSC promotion is weakened 
when land ownership is more fragmented. Although in Russia the federal gov-
ernment is the only land owner, many small companies leasing pieces of the 
forest can correspond to fragmented ownership, both in the Priluz’e leskhoz in 
European Russia and the Chuguevskii leskhoz in the Far East. The result in 
Priluz’e matches Cashore’s hypothesis, in that FSC gained little legitimacy with 
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companies. Most of these companies are small and are thus oriented toward 
local markets where FSC has little worth. The Chuguevskii leskhoz in the Far 
East has a similar situation of fragmented forest ownership. However, these 
smaller companies are now showing a much greater interest in FSC than many 
of the larger companies logging in Primorsk. Through WWF’s efforts to unite 
the companies and strive for joint certification, FSC has gained legitimacy 
rather effectively. Once again, Cashore’s assumption does not apply to the Far 
East. Despite the values of the Chinese timber markets, WWF’s concerted effort 
to seek out the sustainable niches of the timber market has created a belief 
among Chuguevskii leaseholders in FSC’s legitimacy. 
The strategy of market intervention is representative of the way in which 
WWF adapts its projects and efforts to specific contexts. Similarly, WWF’s 
Russian branch as a whole has adapted the organisation’s worldwide strategy of 
“political localism” (Wapner 1996: 10-16) to fit the context of each Russian 
region in which it works. Wapner sees this worldwide strategy as an empower-
ment of the poor through local and low-impact forms of economic development 
and nature conservation. Priluz’e Model Forest’s non-wood resource production 
fits this description, as does the strengthening of civil society through discussion 
groups and public forums both in Pskov and Priluz’e. Due to Russia’s specific 
breed of post-Soviet public disempowerment, WWF changes its strategy and 
channels environmental awareness and involvement in their projects through a 
community’s intelligentsia. This is not always true empowerment of the indi-
vidual, nor is it political localism at the most basic level, but rather commonly a 
popular acceptance of a WWF project. 
 
In the Far East, WWF’s Kedr demonstration project includes no public par-
ticipation. Wapner (1996: 83-88) found that comparing this case with a WWF 
project in Zambia highlights several interesting aspects of Russia’s unique eco-
nomic and social situation. The latter is more typical of WWF’s worldwide 
strategy of political localism, in that WWF enlists the help of locals to stop 
illegal poaching within a nature preserve. Previously in Zambia and now in 
Primorsk, WWF’s conservation efforts create a conflict with local communities, 
in that people are often economically forced to poach, in the case of Zambia, or 
illegally log, in the case of the Far East. In Zambia, WWF resolved this conflict 
with a programme called Administrative Design for Game Management Areas 
(ADMADE), which trains and employs local citizens in anti-poaching brigades. 
With Kedr in Russia, WWF selected a professional forester with experience in 
business and government to head the forest protection brigade. In this case, 
Russian forest legislation is so complicated and in such a constant state of flux 
that WWF felt a background in Russian forestry was necessary for the members 
of Kedr. Consequently, WWF hired a lawyer specializing in the Russian forest 
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code to constantly update Kedr’s members. This shows how WWF adopts its 
strategy to fit the Russian context. 
Furthermore, WWF adapts its strategy to differing contexts in different re-
gions of the country. When Russia’s borders are seen as institutions, we find 
very different societies developing in response to China and close to Western 
Europe. The different levels of environmental sensitivity across Russia’s Asian 
and European borders lead to radically differing economic opportunities. We 
saw how WWF’s inspection brigades and market research campaign in the Far 
East are a direct reaction to the economy of Russia’s border with China. In the 
West, however, with environmentalism firmly established, WWF gains a head 
start in working to align Russian companies with green markets. 
 
 
